Pakistan’s ASBM Claim Raises More Questions Than Answers: What The SMASH Test Really Means For INS Vikrant
Pakistan’s announcement this week that it has successfully test-fired a “ship-launched anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)” has triggered a wave of excitement across its domestic defense ecosystem. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) confirmed the launch, stating that an “indigenously developed” missile had successfully engaged sea and land targets “with high precision” in a test witnessed by the Naval Chief, senior officials, engineers and scientists. Beyond this, few details were provided.
Yet, within hours, the relatively sparse official statement was overwhelmed by an aggressive online narrative. Pro-Pakistan portals and social-media accounts began promoting the missile as a Mach-8 hypersonic carrier-killer capable of reaching 700–850 km and threatening India’s aircraft carrier INS Vikrant.
Multiple doctored videos also appeared on social media, with captions seeking to back the exaggerated claims about the ability of the missile fired.
Notably, none of these claims appear in the ISPR release. They emerge instead from blogs and commentary sites with a history of amplifying Pakistan’s missile programme far beyond what official sources confirm.
To understand this better, it helps to look at the documented history of the SMASH system. In November 2024, Pakistan first revealed a ship-launched ballistic missile designated P282 SMASH, tested from a Zulfiqar-class (F-22P) frigate. Open sources placed its range at roughly 350 kilometers, consistent with characteristics of the Chinese CM-401, a short-range anti-ship ballistic missile marketed for export. That system was explicitly framed as a coastal anti-access/area-denial weapon useful in defending Pakistan’s littoral zone, but nowhere close to the long-range hypersonic imagery now circulating online.
In contrast, the latest test has not been accompanied by specifications, range data, speed classification, seeker details or even an identified launch platform. ISPR released a short video showing a missile launch and target impact at sea, but without telemetry or technical parameters. One Malaysian defense portal claimed the missile was fired from a Chinese-built Type 054A/P frigate (PNS Tippu Sultan) and possesses hypersonic capability and extended range. But these assertions do not come from the Pakistan Navy or government sources, nor have they been corroborated by independent defense analysts.
The core issue is not whether Pakistan has tested a missile—clearly it has—but whether the system being advertised online corresponds to any known, verifiable capability. At present, there is no official data supporting claims of hypersonic speed, 700+ km range or carrier-kill accuracy. The only publicly documented SMASH variant remains the short-range (approximately 350 km) ballistic missile tested last year.
Even if Pakistan is attempting to evolve that system, a critical component of any ASBM is not the missile itself but the sensor-to-shooter chain that enables it to hit a moving naval target. Anti-ship ballistic missiles require a complex surveillance architecture—satellites, long-range radars, maritime patrol aircraft and real-time data links. This is essential because a carrier group can alter course and speed significantly during the missile’s flight time. Without continuous tracking, the missile will simply arrive where the target used to be, not where it is.
China, the world’s primary ASBM operator, has invested heavily in precisely this kind of wide-area ocean surveillance network. Pakistan, by contrast, does not operate an independent maritime ISR constellation. Its maritime domain awareness relies mainly on coastal radars and limited airborne assets, supplemented where available by Chinese intelligence support. There is no open-source evidence to suggest Pakistan possesses the sustained, real-time tracking ability required to engage a carrier group hundreds of kilometers out at sea.
It is also important to consider the operational backdrop. In 2025, during Operation Sindhoor, the Indian Navy deployed an extended 36-ship presence—including an INS Vikrant-led carrier battle group—into the Arabian Sea following the Pahalgam attack. Senior Indian officials have stated that the Pakistan Navy was effectively confined to the harbor and coastline during this period.
This was a significant loss of face for a service already grappling with maintenance problems, propulsion failures, and reduced sea-readiness across several platforms. Against that reality, a dramatic capability announcement, especially one with ambiguous technical details, serves an obvious signaling function.
For India, the picture remains steady. INS Vikrant operates within a layered carrier battle group, equipped with Barak-8 long-range surface-to-air missiles, MF-STAR AESA radar, advanced electronic warfare suites, chaff and decoy dispensers, and CIWS. It sails with Kolkata-class destroyers and Talwar-class frigates that add their own air-defense and strike layers, alongside submarine support. Additionally, the DRDO is developing a new long-range naval interceptor capable of engaging high-velocity ballistic threats—precisely the class of missile Pakistan is now claiming to have tested.
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